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Abstract
We show that there may be circumstances in which a principal prefers not to observe
the project choice of an agent that acts on her behalf. The ability of the agent
is private information. Projects differ with respect to the amount of risk. If the
principal can observe the project choice of the agent, the latter will use that choice
as a signal. In the separating equilibrium, an agent with high ability then chooses a
project that is too risky. If more difficult projects require more effort, there are two
opposite effects. The shirking effect implies that the agent chooses a project that is
too safe. The signaling effect implies that he chooses a project that is too risky. The
net effect is ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for promotion
policies.
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1 Introduction
A wealth of literature studies the problem that a principal faces if she wants an agent
to exert effort or choose a project on her behalf. Often, this problem is studied using
the canonical principal-agent model. The optimal solution suggested by that literature
has the principal offering an explicit incentive scheme that balances the trade-off between
incentives and risk (see e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2001).
Yet, the career concerns literature shows that agents may be willing to act in the
principal’s interest, even in the absence of explicit incentives (see e.g. Holmstrom, 1982
or 1999, Gibbons and Murphy, 1992, or Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999). Models in
this literature typically assume that the agent’s ability is unknown to both the principal
and the agent. Consider a simple model with two periods. Suppose that the agent’s output
in period 1 is a function of his ability, his effort, and some noise. In the second period,
the agent’s wage will depend on his perceived ability which in turn depends on realized
output. This gives the agent an incentive to supply effort in the first period, which is in
the interest of the principal.
This suggests that career concerns of an agent are good news for the principal. It
induces the agent to work harder than he otherwise would, in an attempt to impress the
marketplace about his ability. Of course, it does not imply that career concerns yield a
first-best outcome. Holmstrom (1982) shows that in a multiperiod setting, from a welfare
point of view, the agent’s equilibrium effort is excessive in early periods and insufficient in
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later stages of his career. Both Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) and Zwiebel (1995) provide
models in which the agent’s project choice is either too conservative or too safe.
In this paper, we provide a model in which career concerns, and the agent’s desire to
impress the marketplace, may actually hurt the principal. In a nutshell, the argument is as
follows. Consider a case in which the agent knows his own ability, but the principal does
not. The agent has to implement a project on behalf of the principal. Perceptions of his
ability are important, as they are in the standard career concerns model. The agent then
has an incentive to try to impress the principal (or, more generally: the job market) by
undertaking difficult projects, and thereby signalling his ability. This is especially true if
the outcome of the project is hard to observe in the short term, or if the outcome is only
a noisy function of ability. By choosing to undertake difficult projects, the agent gives the
impression that he has high ability. In fact, the agent may even be inclined to undertake
a project that is too difficult for him. Obviously, this is not in the best interest of the
principal. In such a situation, the principal is better off if she cannot observe the difficulty
of the project that the agent implements, so he is not able to impress her by his choice of
project.
In our benchmark model, the interests of principal and agent are perfectly aligned
in the sense that both have the same long-run objectives. For example, both a venture
capitalist and an entrepreneur have an interest in implementing a profitable project. Also,
both an economist and an economics department have an interest in having high-quality
publications. The principal wants the agent to implement the project that gives her the
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highest expected long-term pay-off. If the project choice is unobservable, the agent himself
also wants to implement that project, as it best serves his long-run prospects on the job
market. If the project choice is observable, however, the agent has an incentive to signal
his ability by choosing a more difficult project.
We extend the model to allow for the agent’s disutility of effort. In that case, the
principal faces a trade-off. If she remains uninformed about the agent’s project choice, the
agent will not choose a project that is too difficult. But he may then choose a project that
is too easy, as easy projects require less effort. We thus have a trade-off between signalling
and shirking.
Our model applies to situations in which workers have a high discretion to implement
their own projects. Knowledge workers are a good example. For instance, consider the case
of a young economist who contemplates a suitable outlet for his work. First suppose that
his department will only be able to observe his actual publication record. The choice of
journal will then be a trade-off between the probability of acceptance and the quality of the
journal. The interests of the economist and his department are perfectly aligned. But now
consider the case in which the department can also observe where this economist submits
his paper, and has to base career decisions on that observation. In that case, he will be
inclined to send his paper to a better journal than he otherwise would, in an attempt to
signal that his quality is higher than it really is. Similarly, a scientist that applies for an
nsf-grant, will be evaluated on the basis of his project, rather than on whether the project
will actually be successful. Such a scientist then has an incentive to propose projects that
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are too ambitious.
As another example, consider a firm that consists of a number of departments. The
manager of each department proposes and implements a risky project that has a high prob-
ability of failure. The probability that a project is successful, depends on the unobservable
quality of a manager. The remuneration and career opportunities of a manager depend on
his perceived ability. When the executive board can only observe whether or not a project
has been implemented and the interests of the firm as a whole and each individual manager
are perfectly aligned, then the manager will choose the project that maximizes expected
profits. But when the executive board can also observe the nature of the project that is
implemented, a manager will be inclined to implement a riskier project than he otherwise
would, in an attempt to signal that his ability is high. Also in this case, even though the
incentives of the individual and the group are perfectly aligned, the desire to signal leads
to a decision that is more risky than the first-best solution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss some related
literature in section 2. Section 3 describes the basic set-up of our benchmark model, in
which the interests of principal and agent are perfectly aligned. In section 4, we solve
that model. We show that the principal always prefers not to be able to monitor the
agent’s choice of project — or at least, to commit not to let such an observation influence
the agent’s career. In section 5, we introduce a conflict of interest between principal and
agent. Now, the principal prefers to monitor the agent’s project choice when the conflict
of interest is sufficiently large. Section 6 considers an extension in which the principal
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can commit to her probability of monitoring. In that case, she can often find the perfect
balance between signalling and shirking, and always induce the agent to implement the
first-best project. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In the introduction, we already noted that most of the existing literature predicts that
agents will be too conservative or safe in the presence of career concerns. Zwiebel (1995)
shows that career concerns may induce an agent to refrain from undertaking innovations
that are risky. Suppose that the principal uses some relative performance evaluation.
Implementing non-standard, risky innovations then implies that the agent will be evaluated
less accurately than his peers who undertake standard innovations. Hence, in this sense
career concerns lead to excessive conservatism in the selection of projects.
In a corporate finance framework, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) demonstrate that a
manager may deliberately distort investment policy in favor of relatively safe projects in
an attempt to build his reputation. In their model, the manager’s ability and his project
choices are private information. The manager’s ability can only be inferred from observed
successes or failures. As failures are more readily observable than successes, the manager
has an incentive to choose projects that are relatively safe and will be more likely to
succeed.
Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1989) give another reason why a manager may be
too conservative. Suppose that a manager, who initially has invested in a new production
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equipment, learns that he has made the wrong choice, and that there is equipment available
that could do the job at lower cost. The manager may then still be inclined not to switch
to the new technology, out of fear that the market will find out that he has made the wrong
decision and will therefore perceive him as a low ability manager. In Holmstrom and Ricart
i Costa (1986), managers will not undertake projects as often as they should, and are too
conservative in that sense. The authors show this in a model of career concerns, where the
agent can also be given explicit incentives.
All the models discussed above have one thing in common: career concerns induce
decisions by agents that are suboptimal from the point of view of the manager. That is
also the case in our model. Yet, in the papers discussed above, the principal is still better
off than he would be in the absence of managerial career concerns. In our model, the mere
presence of career concerns may actually make the principal strictly worse off.
Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) consider a law firm consisting of a number of attor-
neys who work for two periods. In the first period they exert observable effort (the number
of working hours), in the second period some attorneys will be selected as partners. There
are two types of attorney: the low type dislikes working more than the high type. Part-
ners share revenues, which depend on working hours spend. With complete information
attorneys will choose their first-best working hours. With incomplete information, there
is a separating equilibrium in which the high type will work inefficiently long hours, for
much the same reason as we have in our model: in order to convince the principal of being
a high type. Still, there are crucial differences with our set-up. Choosing not to observe
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effort will not make principals better off in Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor: the attorney’s
signalling actually benefits them, as longer hours imply higher output.
Prat (2005) also considers a framework in which a principal may be better off if she is
not able to observe the agent’s actions. Yet, his set-up is entirely different from ours. In
his paper, the agent’s ability is unknown to both agent and principal, as is standard in the
career concerns literature. The outcome of the agent’s action depends on the state of the
world. The agent receives a signal about this state of the world. With unobservable actions,
the principal can only observe the outcome, but with observable actions, the principal can
observe both the action and the outcome. Hence, the agent will disregard the signal.
In our model, we consider whether the principal wants to observe the project choice of
the agent. Thus, in a sense we study whether the principal wants to allow ’communication’
between the agent and herself to take place. In this respect, our paper is related to Friebel
and Raith (2004). They show that when the principal allows the agent to communicate, he
will try to convince her that he is better suited for the supervisory role than the incumbent
supervisor. As a result the incumbent may refrain from developing the agent’s skills and
expertise and also may deliberately recruit agents with low abilities. Consequently, it may
be better for the principal not to allow the agent to directly communicate with her.
3 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we introduce our benchmark model in which long-run interests of principal
and agent are perfectly aligned, and the cost of effort for the agent is independent of his
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choice of project. Our set-up is as follows. An agent has the authority to choose some
project to implement on behalf of a principal. A continuum of projects is available. Some
projects are more risky than others, in the following sense. Riskier projects have a lower
probability of success but, if successful, they also yield a higher return. The probability of
success of any project will also depend on the ability of the agent. The higher the ability
of the agent, the higher the probability of success of any given project. For that reason,
we may also refer to ’risky’ projects as ’difficult’ projects.
The easiest way to capture these assumptions is as follows. The continuum of available
projects is indexed by x, with x ∈ [0, x¯]. Projects are identical in terms of their required
effort. If project x is successful, it will yield the principal a payoff x. If it fails, it will
yield payoff 0. The probability that it is successful, is θ − x, with θ the ability of the
agent. Thus, a higher ability agent has a higher probability of success in implementing any
project. Also, for given θ, projects that have a higher payoff when successful, also have
a lower probability of success, and hence are riskier. The expected return on project x is
denoted as R(x), so we have
R(x) = (θ − x)x. (1)
For simplicity, we assume that the ability of the agent is either high or low: θH or θL,
respectively. The true ability is private information. A priori, the probability of a high
type is ρ. The choice of project x thus serves as a signal of the agent’s true ability. We
denote the posterior belief of facing a high type as µ. We assume that x¯ < θL < θH < 1,
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which guarantees that probabilities are always strictly between 0 and 1.
The payoff of the agent is based on two components. The first is the expected return
of the project. There may be several reasons for this. For instance, the agent may have
some intrinsic satisfaction of obtaining a higher expected return. Also, in the long run, the
outcome of the project is observable and the agent’s career will depend on it. The second
component is the short run benefit drawn from the perception that others have of his
ability. A better perception of that ability may for example imply better job opportunities,
either inside or outside the current relationship. When internal job opportunities are
important, the agent will primarily care about the principal’s perception. When external
job opportunities are important, he will primarily care about the perception of outsiders.
For our purposes, this is immaterial. Therefore, in the remainder, we will refer to the
party that forms the relevant perceptions as the receiver in this game. As an illustration,
consider the venture capital example from the introduction. If the venture capitalist has a
higher perception of the entrepreneur’s ability, then the entrepreneur has a better chance
of obtaining financing in the first place. At the same time, the entrepreneur also has an
incentive to choose a project with a high expected return: if he does obtain financing, then
such a project will also give him higher expected monetary rewards.
Expected payoffs for the agent of choosing project x can be denoted as:
BA = α (θ − x)x+ f (µ) , (2)
where the parameter α measures the relative importance of the expected return of the
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project, µ is the receiver’s posterior belief regarding the agent’s type, and f is an increasing
function: the agent is better off the higher the receiver’s posterior of him being a high type.
Expected payoffs for the principal are simply
BP = (θ − x)x (3)
In our venture capital example, this would suggest that the venture capitalist obtains all
revenues from the project. This, however, is immaterial. The only thing we need for our
analysis is that the venture capitalist’s return is proportional to the return on the project.
Our model can be summarized by the time line depicted in Figure 1. In the next
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Figure 1: The Time Line
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4 Solving the benchmark model
In this section, we solve the model we set out above. In section 4.1 we consider the case
in which the project choice is unobservable. Section 4.2 solves the model when the project
choice is observable. Section 4.3 compares the two cases.
4.1 Unobservable Project Choice
Suppose that the agent’s choice of project is unobservable. In that case, the agent’s choice




α (θi − x)x+ f (ρ) ,
which is maximized by setting
xi = θi/2, i ∈ {L,H}. (4)
Note that the project chosen by the agent is also the one that is preferred by the principal,
in the sense that it maximizes BP . In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the first-
best project of type i as xfai , with i ∈ {L,H}. Thus, in this model, we have xfai = θi/2.
Similarly, we will refer to the first-best of the principal facing a type i agent as xfpi . Hence,
we here have x
fp




i . This, however, is no longer
the case once we introduce a conflict of interest, as we do in section 5.
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4.2 Observable Project Choice
If the principal can observe the agent’s choice of project, we have a signalling model. We
first define our equilibrium concept:
Definition 1 A sequential equilibrium of the game described above consists of a strategy
x∗L for the low type, a strategy x
∗
H for the high type, and a system of beliefs µ(x) such that
the following conditions hold:
1. Optimality for the agent; For i = L,H,
x∗i ∈ argmax
x
α (θi − x)x+ f (µ(x)) (5)
2. Bayes’ consistency of beliefs;
µ(x) =

1 if x = x∗H 6= x∗L
ρ if x = x∗H = x
∗
L
0 if x = x∗L 6= x∗H
∈ [0, 1] otherwise
(6)
As an equilibrium refinement, we use Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion, as is
standard in these models. This refinement is based on the following observation. Suppose
that the receiver observes some out-of-equilibrium message x. Then it makes no sense
to believe that this message comes from a type i if, regardless of the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs of the receiver, that type is always strictly worse off playing x rather than playing
his equilibrium strategy x∗i . Formally:
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Definition 2 A sequential equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion is a sequential
equilibrium in which, when observing an out-of-equilibrium action x, the receiver attaches
zero probability to the event that she faces type i if α(θi−x)x+f(1) < α(θi−x∗i )x∗i+f(µ(x∗i )).
We introduce some additional notation. The ability difference of the high type and the
low type is denoted ∆θ ≡ θH − θL. We write fL for the perception payoffs of an agent
that is known to be a low type, and fH for those of an agent known to be a high type:
fL ≡ f(0), fH ≡ f(1). The difference between the two is ∆f ≡ fH − fL.
Throughout the analysis, we restrict attention to the case where it is necessary for the
high type to distort his project choice in order to convince the principal of his type. That






H ) is not a sequential equilibrium. For simplicity,
we will also assume that the parameters of the problem are such that both types will
always choose an internal solution, thus x∗L, x
∗









α (2− θL) .
We take advantage of the arbitrariness of out-of-equilibrium beliefs to assume that an out-
of-equilibrium message is interpreted as being sent by a low type: µ(x) = 0 for x 6= x∗H .
We can then show:















Proof. With the usual arguments, the low type will implement his first-best project in
any separating equilibrium, so x∗L = x
fa
L = θL/2. Also, we need that x
∗
H is such that type L
is just not willing to mimic the high type and being perceived as having high ability. Thus
α (θL/2)










If the high type chooses to defect, his best possible defection is xfaH . Incentive compatibility
for the high type thus requires










With θH > θL, this upper bound on x
∗
H is always higher than the lower bound given by
(8). Therefore, a separating equilibrium always exists. With the usual arguments, the
unique equilibrium surviving Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion has (8) binding for
the high ability type, which establishes the result.






H ) is not
a sequential equilibrium. In other words; we assume that when a type H would set xfaH
in equilibrium, a type L would have an incentive to mimic that strategy. Hence we need
x∗H > x
fa






α∆θ, which is true due to
15







which is also satisfied due to Assumption 1.
4.3 Comparing the two regimes
From the analyses above, we have that in the equilibrium of our benchmark model, the
high type chooses a project that is riskier than his first-best choice. This is not in the best
interest of the principal. The project choice of the low type is unaffected. Both in the case
where his project choice is observable, and in the case where it is not, he chooses to set his
first-best project. We therefore have:
Theorem 2 In the benchmark model, the a priori expected payoffs of the principal are
strictly higher when the project choice is unobservable.
Proof. With unobservability, expected payoffs equal (1− ρ) θ2L/4 + ρθ2H/4. With ob-
servability, they equal (1− ρ) (θH − x∗L)x∗L + ρ (θH − x∗H)x∗H . With x∗L = θL/2 and x∗H >
θH/2 = argmaxx (θH − x)x, we have the result.
Hence, in this case, the principal would like to commit not to be able to observe the
project choice of the agent. In doing so, she would avoid costly signalling by the high type,
that ultimately is also costly for herself. There is a detrimental signalling effect, as we
depict in Figure 2.
Of course, the principal may also try to avoid signaling by trying to make sure that
Assumption (1) is not satisfied. One way to do so is to make ∆f small. Note that ∆f












Figure 2: The Benchmark Case
that is known to be of high ability, and the short-run benefits obtained by an agent that
is known to be of low ability. Interestingly, such an interpretation implies that distortive
signalling can be avoided by having a policy of promoting personnel only on the basis
of some objective measure of output, rather than on the basis of managerial discretion,
granted of course that this is feasible. With such a policy, the high ability type would not
have an incentive to try to impress the principal, and hence would not engage in costly
signalling.
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5 Introducing a conflict of interest
5.1 The Model
We now introduce a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. In our bench-
mark model with unobservable actions, the interests of interests and principal are perfectly
aligned, as we argued in the introduction. Suppose now that the agent has to exert some
effort in implementing a project and, more importantly, that that effort differs among
projects. We will assume that more difficult projects not only require more ability, but
also more effort. To capture this, we assume that project x requires effort γx2. For sim-
plicity, this effort is independent of the quality of the agent. This does not affect our
qualitative results.1 The agent’s payoff now is
BA = α (θi − x)x− γx2 + f(µ), i ∈ {L,H}, (9)
while the principal’s payoff function is unaffected.
5.2 Solving the Model
First consider the case where project choice is unobservable. The agent then simply sets






, i ∈ {L,H}. (10)
Note that α/(α + γ) is strictly between 0 and 1. Hence, if xfai is well-defined in the
benchmark model, then it also is in this model. The principal, however, still wants to
1If more difficult projects require less effort of a high type, then the high type needs less of a distortion
to his project choice to convince the principal that he really is a low type. Ceteris paribus, this makes it
more attractive for the principal to observe his agent’s project choice.
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, i ∈ {L,H}. (11)
We now have a conflict of interest between principal and agent, even in the case where
project choice is unobservable. Similar to the standard principal-agent model, the principal
wants the agent to exert more effort than the latter’s first-best choice. We will refer to the
difference between xfai and x
fp
i as the shirking effect.




α (θi − x) x− γx2 + f (µ(x)) ,
while (6) is unaffected. This yields the following:

















Proof. Again, obviously x∗L = x
fa
L . Incentive compatibility for the low type requires












Incentive compatibility for the high type requires





















With θH > θL, this upper bound on x
∗
H is always higher than the lower bound given by
(13). Therefore, a separating equilibrium always exists. With the usual arguments, the
unique equilibrium surviving Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion has (13) binding
for the high ability type, which establishes the result.
Compared to the benchmark model, the absolute deviation relative to the first-best of
the high type is smaller. Choosing a project different from the first-best is costlier than in
the benchmark model, as it also implies an additional cost of effort. Hence, the high type
does not have to distort as much as before to discourage the low type from mimicking his
choice.
As in the benchmark model, we need xfaH < x
∗
H < 1. Fortunately, the same parameter
restrictions are sufficient to guarantee that in this model:
Lemma 1 In the model with effort, assumption 1 is sufficient to have xfaH < x
∗
H < 1.







































α (2− θL) + γ√
α + γ







































2α+ 2γ + αθL
4 (α + γ)3/2
> 0.
Hence, the lower bound of (14) is decreasing in γ, while the upper bound is increasing in
γ. This implies that if the condition is satisfied in the benchmark case, where effectively
γ = 0, then it is also satisfied for any γ > 0. Hence, if assumption 1 is satisfied, then we
also have xfaH < x
∗
H < 1 in our model with effort.
5.3 Comparing the two regimes
As was the case in our benchmark model, a low type chooses the same project in both
regimes, so we only have to consider the choice of a high type. With a high type, the
first-best of the principle still is xfpH = θH/2. Since her pay-off function is quadratic, the
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preference of the principal boils down to whether x∗H or x
fa
H is closer to x
fp
H . For ease of
exposition, we assume that the principal can choose whether or not to observe the actions
of the agent. We will refer to that decision as whether or not to monitor the agent’s project
choice. We thus explicitly assume that the principal is the receiver. In terms of the time
line of figure 1, we add a stage at t = 0. For simplicity, we assume that monitoring is
costless. Provided that true monitoring costs are not too high, this assumption does not
affect our qualitative results.
For the purposes of this section, it is convenient to define an upper bound on ∆θ. Note
that from assumption 1, we always have ∆θ ≤ 2
√
∆f/α. For any γ ≥ 0, this immediately








/α. We will refer to the latter value as ∆maxθ .
We can now establish the following result:
Theorem 4 (Undersignalling) If ∆θ > ∆
max
θ − γθH/α, the principal chooses to monitor.
If she does, however, the agent will still choose a project that is too safe from the principal’s
perspective.












which, using the definition of ∆maxθ , implies the condition stated in the theorem.
Essentially the result is driven by a trade-off between two effects. The first one is
the shirking effect. Given that we have a conflict of interest, there will be a divergence
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between the principal’s first best project choice xfpH and the high-type agent’s first best
project choice xfaH . The shirking effect represents the extent of this divergence. The second
effect is the signalling effect. In a separating equilibrium, a high type will have an incentive
to separate himself from the low type by choosing a riskier project (a higher x∗H) than he
otherwise would. The incentive to signal pushes the agent’s project choice back towards
the principal’s first best choice. Hence, in this case signalling will be beneficial for the
principal. The result is depicted in Figure 3. In this case, the signalling effect is not strong


















However, there may also be cases in which the signalling effect more than compensates
for the shirking effect. But also in that case, observing the project choice may still make
the principal better off, as long as the project choice with observability is still closer to the
principal’s first best than the agent’s first-best project is. We refer to this case as one of













Figure 4: Oversignalling (∆maxθ − 2γθH/α < ∆θ < ∆maxθ − γθH/α)
Theorem 5 (Oversignalling) If ∆θ ∈ (∆maxθ − 2γθH/α,∆maxθ − γθH/α), the principal chooses
to monitor. If she does the agent will choose a project that is too risky from the principal’s
perspective.




H : the project choice with observability is riskier than the principal’s first-best.
Second, we need x∗H − xfpH < xfpH − xfaH : the project choice with observability is closer to
the principal’s first best than the project choice without observability. From the previous
theorem, we have that the first condition is satisfied if ∆θ < ∆
max




















or ∆θ > ∆
max
θ − 2γθH/α. Combining the two establishes the result.
Finally, there may be cases in which the signalling effect is so strong that the net effect
is to make the principal worse off if he monitors. We depict this case in figure 5. Note that
we also had this case in the previous section, where the shirking effect was zero.
Theorem 6 (Excessive signalling) If ∆θ < ∆
max
θ − 2γθH/α, the principal chooses not to
monitor. The agent chooses a project that is too safe from the principal’s perspective.
Proof. For the result to hold, two conditions need to be satisfied. First, we need
x∗H > x
fp
H : the project choice with observability is riskier than the principal’s first-best.
Second, we need x∗H − xfpH < xfpH − xfaH : the project choice with observability is closer to
the principal’s first best than the project choice without observability. From the previous
theorem, we have that the first condition is satisfied if ∆θ < ∆
max

































Figure 5: Excessive signalling (∆θ < ∆
max
θ − 2γθH/α)
or ∆θ > ∆
max
θ − 2γθH/α. Combining the two establishes the result.
Hence the principal chooses not to monitor the agent’s project choice. With observabil-
ity, she would have excessive signalling. Just like we had in the previous case, the agent’s
project choice is too risky from her point of view. However, in this case, the signalling
effect is so excessive that it is better for the principal to avoid it altogether and settle for
the agent’s first-best choice.
The following figure illustrates the possible outcomes under observability. For given
values of the other parameters, we have that for low ∆θ, there is excessive signalling, for
intermediate ∆θ, there is oversignalling, and for high ∆θ, there is undersignalling. The
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intuition for this result is as follows. The shirking effect is independent of the ability
difference between the two types. Yet, the closer the two types are in terms of ability, the
more the high type has to signal in order to truly differentiate himself from the low type,


























Figure 6: Summary of Results
Of course, it would also be interesting to see how a change in the extent of the conflict
of interest would affect the result. We now address that issue.
Theorem 7 For given ∆θ ≤ 2
√
∆f/α, there exist threshold values γ¯1(∆θ) < γ¯2(∆θ) <
γ¯3(∆θ) such that the following holds:
1. With γ < γ¯1(∆θ), there is excessive signalling,
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2. with γ¯1(∆θ) < γ < γ¯2(∆θ), there is oversignalling,
3. with γ > γ¯2(∆θ), there is undersignalling.
Proof. Consider the cut-off point between excessive signalling and oversignalling, given








/α − 2γθH/α. Denote this cut-off as Ceo(γ).With
γ = 0, the expression becomes 2
√
∆f/α, so we have excessive signalling for all admissible

















Consider some ∆′θ < Ceo(0) = 2
√
∆f/α. The two properties derived above imply that
there is some γ′ such that Ceo(γ′) = ∆′θ. Concavity implies that for all γ












Next, concavity of Ceo and the fact that Ceo(γ
′) < Ceo(0) together imply that Ceo is
decreasing in γ′. Concavity then implies that for all γ′′′ ∈ (γ′,∞) , we have that Ceo(γ′′′) <
Ceo(γ
′). Hence, γ′ is the unique threshold such that the principal faces excessive signaling
with γ < γ′, and faces either oversignaling or undersignaling with γ > γ′.









/α−γθH/α. Denote this cut-off as Cou(γ). With the exact same
28
arguments as above, we can show that, for given ∆′θ, there is a unique threshold γˆ such that
the principal faces oversignaling or excessive signaling with γ < γˆ, and faces undersignaling
with γ > γˆ. Since we have Ceo(γ) < Cou(γ) for all γ > 0, the result is established.
Thus for low enough γ, and hence if the conflict of interest is not too strong, we always
have excessive signaling, just as we had in our benchmark model. For intermediate values
of γ, we have a case of oversignalling. If the conflict of interest is strong enough, we have
undersignalling. This also implies that for low enough γ, the principal chooses not to
monitor. Yet, once γ is high enough, and the conflict of interest is sufficiently high, the
principal does want to monitor.
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, the signalling effect becomes weaker as
γ increases. When the conflict of interest increases, it is less difficult for the high ability
type to differentiate from the low ability type: when mimicking the high type, the low
type now has to incur not only the lower payoff associated with a more risky project, but
also the higher effort. Second, an increase in γ implies that the shirking effect is stronger.
For the same project, the agent now has to exert more effort, regardless of his type. Both
effects lead to the agent choosing safer projects. Hence, excessive signalling becomes less
of an issue.
6 Extension: probabilistic monitoring
So far, we have assumed that the principal faces the binary choice whether to monitor or
not to monitor. Yet, there may be circumstances in which she can commit to monitor with
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some probability. In this section we analyze this scenario.
Suppose that a priori, the principal can commit to monitor with some probability m.
The principal will choose m to maximize expected payoffs. The agent’s payoff now is
BA = α (θi − x)x− γx2 + (1−m) f(ρ) +mf(µ), i ∈ {L,H}. (15)
This can be seen as follows. With probability 1 − m, there is no monitoring, and the
principal’s posterior belief regarding the agent’s quality equals the prior belief ρ. With
probability m, there is monitoring, and the principal can update her belief. Thus, with
m = 1 we are in the observability case, and with m = 0, we are in the unobservability case.
The first-best outcomes of agent and principal are still given by (10) and (11) respectively.
Consider the subgame that starts after the principal has chosenm. A sequential equilibrium
of that subgame requires
x∗i ∈ argmax
x
α (θi − x)x− γx2 +mf(µ(x)),
while (6) is unaffected. This yields the following:


















Proof. Obviously x∗L = x
fa
L . Again, the natural candidate for x
∗
H in a separating
equilibrium is the xˆ for which the incentive compatibility constraint for the low type is just
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binding. The constraint is












For this to be the separating equilibrium we need that xˆ > xfaH ; otherwise the high type
would simply set xfaH , without the low type having an incentive to mimic that strategy.
This implies that to have x∗H = xˆ, we require m ≥ 14∆f
α2∆2θ
α+γ
. This establishes the result.
We now have:










Proof. The best the principal can do is to achieve his first-best. From (16) and (11),




















For this to be the optimal m, we require, first, that m∗ ∈ [0, 1] and, second, that m∗ is such
that the high type indeed chooses a distortive signal (x∗H > x
fa
H ). For the first condition,
note that m∗ > 0. It is easy to verify that m∗ = 1 if ∆θ = ∆maxθ − γθH/α. With m∗ strictly
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increasing in ∆θ, this implies that the first condition is satisfied if ∆θ < ∆
max
θ − γθH/α.
For the second condition, we require, using lemma 2,
(α∆θ + γθH)
2







which immediately simplifies to (α∆θ + γθH)
2 > α2∆2θ, and is satisfied for any γ > 0. This
establishes the result.
The intuition for this result can be seen from the figures that we used earlier. If there
is oversignalling (so we are either in the case depicted in Figure 4, or in that depicted in
Figure 5), the principal can achieve her first-best by lowering the probability of monitoring.
Yet, in the case of undersignalling (so we are in the case depicted in Figure 3), it is not
possible to reach the first-best, as the probability of monitoring cannot chosen to be higher
than 1.
We also have:
Theorem 9 Suppose m∗ < 1. We then have ∂m∗/∂γ > 0 and ∂m∗/∂∆θ > 0.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 8.
Thus, as the conflict of interest increases, the principal wants to monitor more inten-
sively; shirking now becomes more of a problem, while signalling is less of an issue. Also,
the principal wants to monitor more intensively as the difference in ability between the two
types of agent increases. If that difference is high, there will be less signalling, so observing




In this paper, we have shown that an agent’s career concerns may hurt the principal. If
the agent’s project choice is observable, then he has an incentive to try to impress the job
market by choosing a project that is more difficult and more risky than he can actually
handle. This hurts his principal, who would prefer the agent to pick a project that is more
suitable for his capabilities. We have also shown that if more difficult projects require more
effort, there is a trade-off between the signaling effect explained above, and a shirking effect.
The principal will be more eager to observe the agent’s project choice if shirking is more
of an issue. If quality differences between ’good’ and ’bad’ agents are larger, the principal
will also be more eager to observe the agent’s project choice. In that case, a ’good’ agent
does not have that much of a need to distort his project choice, so the downside to the
principal of observing the project choice of the agent, is also smaller.
One implication of our results is that it may be better to base remuneration and pro-
motion on strict output criteria rather than on the discretion of the principal, provided
that this is feasible. With strict rules, the principal’s impression of her agent does not play
a role in the remuneration and promotion decision. Thus, effectively, a signalling attempt
can be prevented. Of course, the principal only wants to do this in cases where she prefers
not to observe the agent’s project choice.
Interestingly, our paper may also shed new light on the overconfidence or self-serving
bias (see e.g. Camerer, 1997 or Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). A wealth of psychological
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evidence suggests that a vast majority of subjects overrate their own skills. In our model
the same phenomenon occurs: agents choose projects that are more difficult than what
they can actually handle. Yet, in our model, this is not due to a systematic overestimate
of one’s own abilities, but rather to a deliberate strategic attempt to distort the impression
of others. In a related paper (Haan et al., 2006), we show that the behavior of contestants
in the TV game show The Weakest Link follows the same pattern. Contestants who have
to bet money on whether they will be able to answer some general knowledge question,
make riskier choices if the perception of their skill by others is more important.
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